This paper studies wage adjustment during the recent crisis in regulated and unregulated labor markets in Italy. Using a unique dataset on immigrant workers, we show that before the crisis wages in the formal/regulated and informal/unregulated sectors moved in parallel (with a 18 percent premium in the formal labor market). During the crisis, however, formal wages did not adjust down while wages in the unregulated informal labor market fell so that by 2013 the gap had grown to 38 percent. The difference is especially salient for workers in "simple" occupations where there is high substitutability between immigrant and native workers. Our results are consistent with the view that labor market regulation prevents downward wage adjustment during recessions.
Introduction
The Great Recession has brought a substantial increase in unemployment in Europe. The unemployment rate in the euro area has grown from 8 percent in 2008 to 12 percent in 2014. The change in unemployment has been very heterogenous. In northern Europe, unemployment did not grow substantially or even fell: in Germany, for example, unemployment rate has actually declined from 7 to 5 percent. At the same time, in Greece unemployment has grown from 8 to 26 percent, in Spain from 8 to 24 percent, and in Italy from 6 to 13 percent.
Why has unemployment dynamics been so different in European countries? The most common explanation is the difference in labor market institutions that prevents wages from adjusting downward. If wages cannot decline, negative aggregate demand shocks (such as the Great Recession) result in growth of unemployment. On the other hand, if wages can fall, labor markets reach a new equilibrium with unemployment rates returning to normal levels. Adjustment of nominal wages in response to macroeconomic shocks is especially important in the euro area where the labor markets cannot accommodate shocks through exchange rate depreciation or through internal labor mobility (migration among EU countries is much more limited than, for example, the labor mobility across US states).
While this argument is straightforward, it is not easy to test empirically. Indeed, cross-country studies of labor markets are subject to comparability concerns. The same problems arise in comparing labor markets in different industries within the same country. In order to construct a convincing counterfactual for a regulated labor market, one needs to study a non-regulated labor market in the same sector within the same country. This is precisely what we do in this paper through comparing formal and informal markets in Italy over the course of 2001-13. We consider informal employment as a proxy for unregulated counterfactual to the regulated formal labor market.
We use a unique dataset, a large annual survey of immigrants working in Lombardy carried out by the Our data cover around 4000 full-time workers every year; one fifth of them works in the informal sector.
The dataset is therefore sufficiently large to allow us comparing the evolution of wages in the formal and informal sector controlling for household characteristics, occupation, skills and other individual characteristics (age, gender, year of arrival to Italy and country of origin). We use the difference-in-differences methodology.
Our main hypothesis is that a large recession in Italy (and Lombardy) should have resulted in a larger decline of wages in the unregulated labor market (i.e. in the informal sector) relative to the regulated labor market (i.e. the formal sector).
Our main result is presented in Figure 1 that shows logarithms of wages in formal and informal sector controlling for occupation, gender, age, education, country of origin, family characteristics. We do find that the wage differential between formal and informal sector has increased after 2008. Moreover, while wages in the informal sector decreased by about 20 percent in 2008-13, wages in the formal sector virtually did not fall at all. This is consistent with the view that there is substantial downward stickiness of wages in the regulated labor markets. Interestingly, before the recession, wages moved in parallel in the formal and the informal sectors -confirming the validity of the parallel trends assumption required for difference-indifferences estimation and showing that both regulated and unregulated labor markets have a similar degree of upward flexibility of wages.
The conventional wisdom relates the downward stickiness of wages to the minimum wage regulation.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to carry out randomized control trials to test this relationship directly; nor we are aware of natural experiments that exogenously change minimum wages in differential ways within the same industry and the same country. We construct sector-specific minimum wages using information from collective bargaining at the industry level. We find that the effect in Figure 1 is similar in occupations where the average wage is close to the minimum wage and in those where the average wage is far above the minimum wage. Therefore minimum wages do not seem to explain the downward stickiness of wages in the formal labor market.
We also check whether the effect is stronger in "simple" rather than "complex" occupations. The former require generic skills and allow for greater substitutability between workers (in particular, between natives and immigrants) within occupations and across occupations. In such occupations we should expect a greater downward adjustment in the absence of regulation. On the contrary, in complex occupations, workers have specific skills and are harder to replace; therefore even in unregulated labor markets wages may not decline during the recession. This is exactly what we find: the increase in the wage differential between the formal and informal sector during the recession is stronger in simple rather than complex occupations.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, there is the literature on the labor markets' reaction to recessions and the respective channels of adjustment. The seminal contribution by Blanchard and Katz (1992) studies the response of the US economy to regional shocks and shows that inter-state labor mobility is the major channel of adjustment in the long run. After seven years local economies adjust to aggregate demand shocks in terms of labor force participation and unemployment rates; the workers who cannot find jobs in the depressed states move out to other states. Decressin and Fatas (1995) carry out a similar analysis for European regions and find that the adjustment mechanisms in Europe are different.
European workers are less mobile than their American counterparts; in Europe, adjustment mainly occurs through reduced labor force participation. Mauro and Spilimbergo (1999) consider the case of a single European country, Spain, focusing on the heterogeneity of the adjustment mechanisms across skilled groups.
They show that high-skilled Spanish workers respond with migrating from the depressed provinces while the low-skilled drop out of the labor force or remain unemployed.
The analysis of the heterogeneity of the workforce and therefore of the labor market adjustments has greatly benefited from the development of measures of skill content of occupations by Autor et al. (2003) , Peri and Sparber (2009) , Goos et al. (2009 ), Goos et al. (2014 . We use these measures to disaggregate the channels of adjustment in our data.
There is also a large literature using the difference-in-differences approach to analyze the impact of labor market institutions on employment. In particular, the seminal paper by Card and Krueger (1994) compares the employment evolution in New Jersey after a 20 percent increase in the minimum wage with neighboring Pennsylvania (where the minimum wage did not change). The recent surveys of this literature by Neumark et al. (2013) and Neumark (2014) conclude that minimum wages do have a negative impact on employment.
There is also a literature on dual labor markets in Europe. Bentolila et al. (2012) compare labor market institutions in France and Spain and try to explain the strikingly different evolution of unemployment during the Great Recession in the two countries. The unemployment rates were around 8 percent in both France and Spain just before the Great Recession; by 2011, the unemployment rate has increased to 10 percent in France and to 23 percent in Spain. The authors explain the differential by the larger gap between the firing costs in the permanent and temporary contracts, and the laxer rules on the use of the latter in Spain. The issue of the dual labor market in Europe is discussed in detail by Boeri (2011) , who provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on the impact of recent labor market reforms in Europe. Our paper also considers dual labor markets, although we study the duality of formal/regulated vs. informal/unregulated markets rather than that of permanent vs. temporary contracts. Another study of the labor market adjustment during the Great Recession is Elsby et al. (2015) , who analyze the experience of the US and the UK. They find that nominal wage rigidity did play a role in the US during the Great Recession but not in the UK. Meghir et al. (2015) develop a model with endogenous selection of firms and workers into the formal and informal sectors and calibrate it using Brazilian data. They show that on average firms in the formal sector are more productive and pay higher wages (which is consistent with our findings). Since we do not have data on informality at the firm level, we assume that the recession has a similar effect on the labor productivity in the formal and in the informal sector (controlling for industry and worker characteristics).
Since our data include only immigrants, a direct comparison of the effects of the recession on immigrant and native workers is not possible. However, we use the insights from the literature on the impact of immigration on wages and employment of natives and on the evolution of labor market outcomes of immigrants versus natives through the business cycle. Orrenius and Zavodny (2010) compare the impact of the Great Recession on Mexican-born immigrants and native US workers with similar characteristics. They find that immigrants' employment and unemployment rates are particularly affected by the recession; the impact is especially strong for low-skilled and illegal immigrants. The authors also argue that one of the major channels of adjustment is a great reduction of the inflow of Mexican immigrants during the recession. Cadena and Kovak (2015) show that Mexican-born immigrants help to equalize spatial differences across local US labor markets. Interestingly, this takes place in both high-skilled and low-skilled segments of the labor market. Low-skilled immigrants turn out to be very responsive to labor market shocks which helps to equilibrate local labor markets even though low-skilled natives are not mobile. Cortes (2008 ), Manacorda et al. (2012 and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) study the impact of immigration on the wages of natives and find that immigrant and native workers are imperfect substitutes. Using data on fifteen Western European countries during the 1996-2010 period, D'Amuri and Peri (2014) find that an inflow of immigrants generates a reallocation of natives to occupations with a stronger content of complex abilities. This reallocation is more salient in countries with low employment protection and for workers with low education levels. D'Amuri and Peri (2014) also show that this process remained significant-even if it slowed down-during the first years of the Great Recession.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the Italian labor market. Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background information on the Italian labor market
The Italian formal labor market has centralized collective bargaining institutions. After the abolishment of the automatic indexation of wages to past inflation (the so-called scala mobile) in 1992, Italy created of a twotier bargaining structure where the wage was determined in both plant-level and industry-level/centralized negotiations. However, as Boeri (2014) documents, the percentage of firms relying on the two-tier bargaining decreased over time, down to less than 10 percent in 2006: employers in Italy prefer following the wages set by industry agreements, rather than through further negotiations at the plant level.
The Italian formal labor market is also characterized by relatively high levels of employment protection, and relatively low levels of both unemployment benefits and active labor market policies (such as training programs, job search assistance, counseling, etc.). According to the 2013 OECD indicators of employment protection, Italy ranks 30 out of the 34 OECD members in terms of protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals, and 27 out of 34 in terms of regulation on temporary forms of employment.
1 These features make the Italian context different for instance from the flexicurity of Scandinavian countries. However, over the last decades, and similarly to other European countries, several reforms aimed at introducing various types of temporary contracts and increasing labor market flexibility. The large size of the informal labor market implies that immigrants who reside in Italy without a regular residence permit (we will refer to these as "undocumented" immigrants) have a relatively high probability to find a job. Given that they are not entitled to work in the formal sector, illegal immigrants might prefer to locate in countries like Italy with a large shadow economy. In terms of labor market outcomes, both documented and undocumented immigrants lag behind natives with similar levels of education. For Ichino and Riphahn (2005) , Kugler and Pica (2008) , Cappellari, Dell'Aringa and Leonardi (2012) , Leonardi and Pica (2013) , and Cingano, Leonardi, Messina and Pica (2015) for works on the effects of changes in employment protection legislation. For empirical evidence on the consequences of temporary work employment on subsequent labor market outcomes, see Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) ; Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) ; Autor and Houseman (2010) .
instance, Accetturo and Infante (2010) show that returns to schooling for immigrants are much lower than the ones for native Italians. Moreover, immigrants residing in Italy are likely to work in occupations that are not appropriate to their level of education. As the OECD (2008) report suggests, one of the reasons why immigrants' over-qualification occurs is that Italy is a relatively new immigration country. Given that an appropriate match between jobs and immigrants' qualifications takes time-because for instance immigrants do not have well-developed professional networks in the host country or they lack complementary skills such as the knowledge of the host country language-upon arrival immigrant workers are likely to accept unskilled jobs with the hope of upward professional mobility as their stay in Italy continues.
Methodology
We use a difference-in-differences methodology. We evaluate the differences in behavior of wages in the formal and informal sectors before and after the crisis by estimating the following equation:
Here W is the logarithm of after-tax wage of a full-time employed worker i from country of origin c working in occupation o and residing in province p at the time of the interview t (t = 2001, ..., 2013). 3 We include dummy variables δ o , δ c , δ p , and δ t for occupations, countries of origin, provinces of residence and year fixed effects, respectively. Furthermore, control variables X i include gender, age, age squared, years in Italy, education, married dummy, children abroad and children in Italy. We cluster the standard errors by province of residence.
Our main variables of interest are Inf ormal i (dummy for the employment in the informal sector) and
Crisis t Inf ormal i -the interaction term of Inf ormal i and Crisis t . The latter is the dummy for years after 2009: Crisis t = 1(t 2009). 4 As the informal labor market is unregulated, we should expect β < 0 -during the crisis the wages in the informal sector should adjust downward to a greater extent than in the regulated formal sector.
In order to understand what drives the wage adjustment or the lack thereof, we also investigate the heterogeneity of treatment effects. First, we distinguish between occupations where the minimum wage 3 Conditioning on full-time employment, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term does not include the differential effect of informality during the crisis through changes in labor supply. In Table 4 we show regressions where we use information on individuals who are employed on part-time basis.
4 In section 5.1, we show that the crisis significantly affected labor market outcomes from 2009 onwards. However, we find qualitatively similar results, but smaller magnitudes, when we consider an alternative proxy for Crisis using Crisist = 1(t 2008) (i.e., assuming that the crisis started a year before).
is likely to be binding and those where wages are safely above the minimum wage. For each profession we calculate the average pre-crisis wage in 2007 and divide it by the occupation-specific minimum wage. We then rank occupations by the ratio of average wage to minimum wage and check whether results differ for professions above and below the median of this ratio. More precisely, we estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences specification similar to equation (1), including three additional interaction terms: the interaction of high average wage to minimum occupation dummy with crisis time dummy Crisis t High avg. wage/min. wage o , the interaction of high average wage to minimum occupation dummy with informal employment dummy Inf ormal i High avg. wage/min. wage o , and the triple interaction Crisis t Inf ormal i High avg. wage/min. wage o . The coefficient of interest in these specifications is the one associated with the former interaction term. If the minimum wage prevents downward adjustment of wages in the formal sector, we should find a positive sign for Crisis t Inf ormal i High avg. wage/min. wage o , i.e. a stronger effect of the crisis on the wage differential between formal and informal employment for those occupations where wages before the crisis were not too far from the minimum wages.
We also distinguish between simple versus complex occupations. Since simple occupations involve generic skills, there is a greater extent of substitutability between workers (including immigrant and native workers) within such occupations -as well as across such occupations. Therefore in the absence of regulation, such occupations should undergo a more substantial downward wage adjustment during recession. On the other hand, in complex occupations, skills are more specific and workers are less substitutable. In the complex occupations even unregulated labor markets may not see large drops in wages in times of recession and high unemployment. To check this, in a specification similar to (1), we include three additional interaction terms: In this difference-in-difference-in-differences specification, the coefficient of Crisis t Inf ormal i allows to quantify the effect of the recession on the wage differential between formal (regulated) and informal (unregulated) employment for complex professions. We expect to find a stronger effect for simple rather than complex occupations, i.e. a negative sign of the coefficient of the variable Crisis t Inf ormal i Simple occupations o .
Data
Our main database comes from the annual survey of immigrants undertaken by an independent Italian nonprofit organization called Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-Ethnicity (ISMU). This survey provides a large and representative sample of both documented and undocumented immigrants residing in Lombardy and working in both formal and informal sectors. The ISMU survey adopts an intercept point sampling methodology, where the first step involves listing a series of locations typically frequented by immigrants (such as religious sites, ethnic shops, or healthcare facilities), while in a second step both meeting points and migrants to interview are randomly selected. At each interview, migrants are asked how often they visit the other meeting points, which permits to compute ex-post selection probabilities into the sample. This approach allows the ISMU survey to produce a representative sample of the total immigrant population residing in Lombardy.
5 Table A1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics on immigrants working in the formal sector (regular workers) and the informal sector (irregular workers) as well as on legal (documented) and illegal (undocumented) immigrants.
6 Approximately 10 percent of legal immigrants work in the informal sector.
The informal sector accounts for around 19 percent of the overall (documented and undocumented) foreignborn workforce.
In our main regressions we focust on full-time workers to abstract from changes in labor supply (we show robustness of our findings to including part-time employment as well). Specifically, we consider fulltime employment the following categories of workers: full-time permanent and fixed-term regular workers, irregular workers in stable employment, regular self-employment, and irregular self-employment. Conversely, part-time employment includes the following three categories: regular part-time workers, irregular workers in unstable employment, and subaltern employment (e.g. collaborations). Using this classification, there are about 4,000 full-time-employed respondents in each year. Respondents also provide information about their occupation, country of origin, year of arrival to Italy, monthly earnings, family status etc. Summary statistics are in Table A2 in the Appendix. Table A3 in the Appendix presents the breakdown of the sample by occupations, as well as formal and informal employment for each occupation. The Table also includes average wages in the formal and informal sector and the minimum wage for each occupation.
In order to time the beginning of the recession, we use official macroeconomic data on Lombardy and its eleven provinces. Dustmann et al. (2015) and Fasani (2015) for more detailed description of these data. 6 Throughout the paper we refer to those employed in the formal sector as "regular workers" and those employed in the informal sector as "irregular workers". Similarly, we use "illegal" and "undocumented" interchangeably to denote immigrants residing in Italy without a regular residence permit. There is no national minimum wage in Italy, despite Article 36 of the Constitution states that salaries must be high enough to provide a decent subsistence for the worker and his family. Instead in the highly centralized Italian system, minimum wages are set upon collective bargaining agreements between employers associations and trade unions. In particular, national collective contracts impose minimum salaries for employees at different skill levels in numerous economic activities, covering both unionized and non-unionized workers (Manacorda, 2004) . We collect and reconstruct minimum wages from over 140 nationwide collective contracts in effect in 2007, just before the start of the crisis. We then aggregate minimum wages in order to match the professions included in the ISMU dataset (see Table A3 in Appendix). To our knowledge, there has been no previous study attempting to collect so many collective bargaining agreements and compute occupation-wide minimum wages for Italy.
We adopt several definitions of simple versus complex occupations. Following Peri and Sparber (2009) and D'Amuri and Peri (2014) Once the 23 variables have been selected (see the Table A4 in the Appendix), we normalize them to [0,1] scale. Importantly, we invert the scale for the four communication skills (oral comprehension, written comprehension, oral expression, written expression) and then calculate the average of the 23 variables. The resulting index ranks the professions in the order of complexity where a profession with a high communication skill intensity is considered as complex, whilst high levels of manual skill intensity refer to simple jobs. Finally, we compute the median value for the index and distinguish between simple and complex occupations (i.e.
jobs whose values are above the median are considered simple, and vice versa).
Results

Placebo tests
The identifying assumption of our difference-in-differences specification is that wages of workers in the formal and informal sectors would have to follow the same time trend in the absence of the Great Recession. If this parallel trends assumption holds, our empirical strategy allows to control for all unobserved differences between formal and informal workers that remain constant over time. The estimation results in Table 1 show the absence of an "Ashenfelter's dip" (see Ashenfelter, 1978) , i.e. the wage differential does not change just prior to the crisis, which would invalidate our measurement of the treatment effect. No estimated coefficient of the interaction term P lacebo t Inf ormal i is statistically significant, providing additional confirmation to the validity of our identification strategy.
Wages
Our main results are presented in Table 2 . The first column reports the estimates of specification (1) The other coefficients are intuitive. Holding other things equal, women earn 16 percent less than men.
The effect of age is positive and non-linear. The coefficient at age squared is negative and statistically significant. An additional year increases earnings by 1 percent at the age of 18 but has negative effect after the age of 45; at the age of 55, an additional year of age decreases earnings by about 0.5 percent. Each year spent in Italy raises wages by 1.1 percent. Completion of compulsory school increases wages by 3.4 percent (relative to no schooling), higher education by another 5 percent. Such low returns to education are not surprising given that most immigrants are employed in low-skilled and middle-skilled jobs. Married workers earn wages that are 2 percent higher than those of other workers.
As discussed in Section 3, in order to analyze the role of the minimum wage regulations, we estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences specification similar to (1), but where we allow for a differential effect between occupations where average wage in the formal sector is close to the occupation-specific minimum wage and occupations where average wage is substantially higher than the minimum wage. For each of the 18 occupations we calculate the average pre-crisis wage in 2007 (in the formal sector only) and divide it by minimum wage. Estimates are in column 3 of Table 2 and show that our findings do not differ according to whether this ratio is below or above the median (the coefficient of the interaction term Crisis t Inf ormal i High avg. wage/min. wage o is not statistically different from zero). Therefore the minimum wage is not an important driver of our results.
We also rank occupations according to complexity. As discussed in the Section 4 above, we refer to occupations with high intensity of communications skills and low intensity of manual skills as "complex" and the others as "simple". Our difference-in-difference-in-differences specification in column 4 of Table 2 shows that the crisis increased the wage differential between formal and informal workers less in complex occupations (8 percentage points increase, see the coefficient at Crisis t Inf ormal i ) than in simple occupations (17 percentage points increase, which is the sum of the coefficients at Crisis t Inf ormal i Simple occupations o and Crisis t Inf ormal i ). A possible reason for the larger downward wage adjustment during the recession in simple occupations is that they involve generic skills, which may imply a larger degree of substitutability between workers (including immigrant and native workers).
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Selection
Our results are not biased as long as unobserved omitted differences between formal and informal workers remain constant over time. If this assumption holds, then-conditional on all control variables in our difference-in-differences specifications-immigrants do not self-select into informal work status depending on their unobserved characteristics, and therefore immigrants can be considered exogenously assigned to the treatment group. We illustrate this identifying assumption with an example. Suppose that workers choose between formal and informal jobs depending on some unobserved factors, such as their level of risk aversion.
For instance, more risk-averse workers might be more likely to prefer employment in the formal sector. Our difference-in-differences estimates remain unbiased if differences in risk aversion between formal and informal workers remain similar before and after the crisis. To check whether our findings are due to changes that occurred after the crisis in the composition of the immigrant population with respect to their risk aversion, in Table 3 we show that results remain similar when control variables are added sequentially. We include observables such as gender, age and education, which are important correlates of the level of risk aversion, as previous literature shows (see for instance Barsky et al. 1997 , Guiso and Paiella 2008 , and Borghans et al. 2009 ). Estimates of the interaction term of Inf ormal i and Crisis t in Table 3 are remarkably similar across all specifications.
The table also reports a test in the spirit of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) .
8 After estimating the equation using a restricted set of control variables-as in columns 1-5, where we choose to exclude observed variables that are good predictors of the unobserved risk aversion-denote the estimated coefficient of interest (i.e. the coefficient of the interaction term) as β r . The value of the test is then calculated as the absolute value of β f /(β r − β f ), where β f is the coefficient of the interaction term in column 6 of Table 3 , i.e. from the estimation that includes the full set of covariates. The median value of the test is 13: considering that age, gender and education are variables that are highly correlated with risk aversion-as previous literature
shows-selection on unobserved risk aversion would have to be at least 13 times greater than selection on observables to attribute the entire difference-in-differences estimate to selection effects. This check provides some indirect confirmation that the Crisis dummy is orthogonal to the individuals' risk aversion, i.e. that the composition of formal and informal workers with respect to risk aversion remained very similar before and after the crisis, which is an important identifying assumption in our regressions.
Another potential source of selection is the effect of the Great Recession on return migration. However, this effect would only strengthen our results. By definition, immigrants are the most mobile category of workers. If during the crisis the least successful informal workers are more likely to go back to their home country, then the coefficient of the interaction term in equation (1) would underestimate the true magnitude of the wage reduction for informal workers. To check whether this may represent an issue in our context, in Table A5 in the Appendix we run regressions similar to our main specification, except that we use the information we have on the immigrants' intentions to return to their origin country. More precisely, the dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy equal to 1 if the immigrant intends to return to her home country. This question is only available in the 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 waves of our survey. Therefore we focus on the coefficient of the Inf ormal i variable, while we cannot add the interaction term between the Inf ormal i dummy and the Crisis t variable. Given that the long stay in the host country is likely to highly affect intentions to return (Yang, 2006) , we investigate whether results from this check differ according to the length of stay in Italy: in column 1 of Table A5 there is no restriction on permanence in the host country, column 2 includes individuals whose permanence in Italy is equal to or less than 30 years (as our benchmark regressions), 25 years in column 3, 20 years in column 4 and 15 years in column 5. In all specifications the coefficient of interest is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that selection into return migration does not represent an issue in our context.
Robustness checks
Our main results are obtained for the sample of documented and undocumented immigrants in full-time employment. Table 4 presents a first set of robustness checks. Column (1) excludes illegal immigrants. In column 2 we focus only on part-time workers, and in column 3 on both full-time and part-time employment In our benchmark specifications we restrict the estimation sample to immigrants whose length of stay in Italy does not exceed 30 years. This choice is motivated by Figure A1 , which shows that the distribution of permanence in Italy is much more skewed toward the left for informal workers. This restriction has aimed to ensure common support for the distributions of formal and informal workers. In columns 4-7 of Table 4 we show that our results remain very similar when we do not consider any restriction on length of stay in Italy (column 4) or when we consider different maximum permanence durations: 25 years (column 5), 20 years (column 6) and 15 years (column 7).
In Table 5 we present additional checks. In column (1) In column (5) of Table 5 we allow for both jump and kink in the wage differential between the formal and the informal sector. We find that the coefficients at both the jump and the kink terms are significantly different from zero. In 2009 the wage differential between formal and informal sector increased by 8 percent (see coefficient of Crisis t Inf ormal i ) and, since 2009, the wage differential was growing by 3.3 percent per year.
Employment in the formal and informal sectors
Our results above describe only one channel of the labor market adjustment to the aggregate demand shocks, namely the decline in wages. A relevant question is whether this decrease in wages in the informal sector affects employment rates in both formal (regulated) and informal (unregulated) sector.
In Table 6 we present regressions where the dependent variables are employment in the formal sector (first two columns) or employment in the informal sector (last three columns). In the second and fourth columns we condition on labor force participation, while in the fifth column we condition on employment.
We report and discuss the coefficients of the year dummies (where 2008 is the omitted category). We find that for all specifications the coefficients of year dummies are never significantly different from zero before the beginning of the recession. The first column of Table 6 shows that during the crisis the employment rate These results suggest that the immigrant labor market undergoes a multi-faceted adjustment. Notwithstanding the increase in unemployment rate documented by Figure 2 , the large fall in informal wages during the crisis creates a reallocation from the formal (regulated) to the informal (unregulated) sector, and also generates an increase in the employment rate in the latter sector.
Conclusions
In this paper we study the process of wage adjustment in formal and informal labor markets in Italy. We These results are consistent with the view that regulation is responsible for the lack of wage adjustment and increase in unemployment during the recessions. Our findings are based on data on immigrants rather than the general labor force. However, we also find that our results are more pronounced for the individuals in simple occupations. These are the occupations with relatively easy substitutability between immigrants and natives. This allows us to speculate that our findings can be generalized for low-skilled natives as well.
While we do find that in unregulated labor markets wages adjust down during the recession, the 2009-13 period does not provide an exhaustive answer with regard to the speed and nature of this adjustment. Figure   1 and Table 5 show that wages in the informal sector continue to fall throughout the period. We cannot yet 15 judge whether this continuing decrease in wages is the delayed response to the initial one-off shock or every subsequent decrease is a reaction to the next round of aggregate demand decline. In order to address this important question, we need to collect data on both formal and informal labor market for several years after the economy starts to recover. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data are from the ISMU survey. We restrict the sample to immigrants with permanence in Italy equal to or less than 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only. The dependent variable is the logarithm of after-tax wage. In the first two columns we assume that the true crisis started in 2008. We use data before the crisis ( Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In columns 1, 3 and 4 the crisis started in 2009, while in column 2 in 2008. Difference-in-differences estimation for benchmark results are in columns 1 and 2, for above median value of avg. wage/min. wage. in column 3 and for simple occupations in column 4. Data are from the ISMU survey (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . We restrict the sample to immigrants with permanence in Italy equal to or less than 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only. The dependent variable is the logarithm of after-tax wage. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data are from the ISMU survey (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . We restrict the sample to immigrants with permanence in Italy equal to or less than 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only. The dependent variable is the logarithm of after-tax wage. In columns 1-5, we exclude observed variables that are good predictors of the unobserved risk aversion. We denote the estimated coefficient of interest (i.e. the coefficient of the interaction term) in these specifications as βr. The value of the Altonji et al.'s (2005) test is then calculated as the absolute value of β f /(βr − β f ), where β f is the coefficient of the interaction term in column 6, i.e. from the estimation that includes the full set of covariates. Table 4 : Wage differential between formal (regulated) and informal (unregulated) sector. Difference-in-differences estimation. Robustness checks.
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(1) In the first three columns, we restrict the sample to immigrants with permanence in Italy equal to or less than 30 years. The dependent variable is the logarithm of after-tax wage. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . We restrict the sample to immigrants with permanence in Italy equal to or less than 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only. The dependent variable is the logarithm of after-tax wage. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province. p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation sample of column 1: no restriction on immigrant's permanence in Italy. Column 2: we restrict the sample to immigrants with permanence in Italy equal to or less than 30 years. Column 3: permanence in Italy equal to or less than 25 years. Column 4: permanence in Italy equal to or less than 20 years. Column 5: permanence in Italy equal to or less than 15 years. Data are from the ISMU survey. The information on the intentions to return to the origin country is available for the years 2010-2013. 
